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C H A P T E R O N E
INTRODUCTION: THE FABRICATION OF
PERSONS AND THINGS
Alain Pottage
Each of the contributions to this book addresses the question of how
legal techniques fabricate persons and things. In exploring that ques-
tion, and in asking just what ‘fabrication’ means, each chapter focuses
on a speciﬁc historical, social, or ethnographic context. Given that
these contexts, and the modes of institutional or ritual action which
they disclose, are quite varied, this book does not aim to provide a
general theoretical account of the fabrication of persons and things in
law. Indeed, the term ‘fabrication’ is chosen precisely because it suggests
modes of action which are lodged in rich, culturally-speciﬁc, layers of
texts, practices, instruments, technical devices, aesthetic forms, stylised
gestures, semantic artefacts, and bodily dispositions. Each contribution
shows how, in a given social, historical, or ethnographic context, ele-
ments of this repertoire are mobilised by legal techniques of personiﬁ-
cation and reiﬁcation. The speciﬁc character of these modes of action
would be lost in a general theory of law as an agent of ‘social construc-
tion’. Yet, diverse as they may be, our approaches to the question of
legal fabrication are brought together as resources for reﬂection upon
a speciﬁc institutional predicament. In Western legal systems, persons
and things are now problems rather than presuppositions. One could
point to technology, and biotechnology in particular, as the main fac-
tor here, but there are other reasons for the implosion of the old legal
division between persons and things. For example, those institutions
which effectively ‘naturalised’ legal artefacts (notably, the institution
of inheritance) have lost their central role in law and society. For the
purposes of an introduction, the important point is that the complex
1
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techniques which legal institutions traditionally used to fabricate per-
sons and things no longer function silently and reliably. The legal
boundary between persons and things, rather like that between nature
and culture, is no longer self-evident. In many areas, legal forms have
been colonised by ‘ethical’ (or similarly regulatory) modes of decision-
making, which implicitly acknowledge the impossibility of beginning
within a natural order of things. Collectively, the contributions to this
volume give historical and comparative depth to reﬂection on this
predicament.
The question of how legal institutions construct the category of
the person has been asked often before. For example, a great deal of
attention has been given to the statuses which Western legal systems
attributed (or denied) to married women. Many of these studies imag-
ine legal personality as the institutional clothing of a ‘real’ (natural,
biological, or social) person; and, however critical they might be in
other respects, the distinction between persons and things continues
to function as an untheorised premise, much as it does in orthodox
legal doctrine and theory. In some cases, what is in question is only
the proper attribution of phenomena to either side of an ostensibly
natural division between persons and things. Elsewhere, an immanent
critique of legal constructs is underpinned by the untheorised assump-
tion that legal rules correspond to natural or social facts.1 Of course,
there are studies of the legal status of women which develop sophisti-
cated analyses of legal categories as ideological constructs.2 But even
where the legal person is analysed in these terms, the division between
persons and things remains a silent premise; it resurfaces as a method-
ological commitment to a distinction between construction and reality;
or, in Marxist terms, between science and ideology.3 The contributions
to this book approach the question of fabrication without assuming a
division between persons and things, either as a basic truth about the
nature of phenomena they observe, or as a methodological postulate
1 As in M. Davies and N. Nafﬁne, Are Persons Property? (Dartmouth, Ashgate, 2001).
See, e.g., at p. 99: ‘possessive individualism in law, though still robust in contempo-
rary legal thinking, fails to supply a sensible, credible understanding of our embodied
selves’; and, on the same page, possessive individualism is said to ‘deal poorly with
the facts of female embodiment’.
2 See notably Mary Poovey, Uneven Developments: The Ideological Work of Gender in
Mid-Victorian England (Virago, London, 1989).
3 See, e.g., the observations on social constructivism that are made in Bruno Latour,
Chapter 3.
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which structures observation itself. The distinction between persons
and things may be a keystone of the semantic architecture of Western
law, but our accounts of fabrication distinguish between the semantic
and pragmatic dimensions of law. From that perspective, the distinc-
tion becomes a contingent form, which is sustained by modes of social
action which are productively misunderstood4 by legal semantics.
The distinction between persons is interesting not because there is
some critical discrepancy between the legal construction of the per-
son and the natural reality of human individuality, but because it is
becoming clear that the act of distinguishing between these two orders is
itself radically contingent. In other words, the question now is not how
to ﬁt entities into the ‘right’ category, but to explore the emergence
and deployment of the category itself. It is becoming increasingly clear
that in Western legal systems, as elsewhere, ‘the order of things is deter-
mined by decision, a distinction, that itself is not ordered’.5 So, whereas
critiques of law have so far treated the category of person/thing as an
embedded feature of the world (either in the sense that it mirrors the
ontological structure of the world, or in the sense that it deﬁnes the
terms in which we apprehend the world), the approach taken in this
volume treats it as a purely semantic, aesthetic, or ritual form, which
is produced by particular perspectives or techniques. The distinction ‘is
not itself ordered’ because it is referable to these emergent ways of see-
ing and doing rather than to the ontological architecture of the world.
Not all of the contributors to this volume share the vocabulary of divi-
sions and distinctions (which is drawn from systems theory) or the
theoretical approach which it expresses, but all are concerned to appre-
hend legal and social action without presupposing a categorical divi-
sion between persons and things. More importantly, perhaps, all of the
contributions drop the theoretical prejudice built into the old cate-
gory, which, at least in the case of law, took the person as the privi-
leged term. Whereas traditional accounts of law were concerned only
with the question of how persons were constructed (‘things’ being the
implicit antithesis of ‘persons’) our inquiry is symmetrical, being as
much concerned with the fabrication of things as of persons.
4 For this idea of ‘productive misunderstanding’, see, e.g., Gunther Teubner, ‘Contract-
ing Worlds: The Many Autonomies of Private Law’ (2000) 9(3) Social and Legal
Studies 399.
5 WilliamRasch, ‘Introduction’ to Niklas Luhmann,Theories of Distinction: Redescribing
the Descriptions of Modernity (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2002), p. 24.
3
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RES AND PERSONA
The distinction between persons and things has always been central
to legal institutions and procedures. The institutions of Roman law, to
the extent that Rome can be taken as the origin of the Western legal
tradition, attached persons (personae) to things (res) by means of a set
of legal forms and transactions (actiones) which prescribed all of their
permissible combinations.6 In the common law tradition, this sort of
division is not as precisely drawn as it is in European codiﬁed systems,
but the continuing importance of Hohfeld in Anglo-American legal
theory testiﬁes to the fact that the common law also assumes this fun-
damental division.7 It may even be that, having been constructed and
reﬁned in Roman legal institutions, the basic division was taken up in
other branches of social theory. There is a very powerful argument that
the institutional architecture of Roman law still structures our appre-
hension of society, and that sociology and political theory are more pro-
foundly ‘juridical’ than they imagine themselves to be, precisely because
they presuppose a basic division between persons and things.8 Whether
or not one subscribes to that argument, it reminds us that the distinc-
tion between persons and things is a foundational theme in Western
society, and that legal institutions have played an essential role in con-
stituting and maintaining that distinction. Conﬁdence in what Bruno
Latour calls the ‘old settlement’ is no longer as straightforward as it
might seem. With the advent of biotechnology patents, biomedical
interventions, transgenic crops, and new environmental sensitivities,
the distinction between persons and things has become a focus of gen-
eral social anxiety. In each of these technological areas, persons become
indistinguishable from things: gene sequences are at once part of the
genetic programme of the person and chemical templates from which
drugs are manufactured; embryos are related to their parents by means
of the commodifying forms of contract and property, and yet they are
also persons; depending on the uses to which they are put, the cells of
embryos produced by in vitro fertilisation might be seen as having either
6 See W. T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997),
ch. 1.
7 The classic texts are W.N. Hohfeld, ‘Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1913) 26 Yale Law Journal 16; ‘Some Fundamental
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning’ (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710.
8 The most sophisticated argument is found in Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism (Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 1984).
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the ‘natural’ developmental potential of the human person or the tech-
nical ‘pluripotentiality’ that makes them such a valuable resource for
research into gene therapies. In each of these cases, the categorisation
of an entity as a person or a thing is dependent upon a contingent dis-
tinction rather than an embedded division.
Accordingly to popular perception, legal institutions are supposed
to be based on a natural division between persons and things, and yet
now they seem systematically to transgress that natural ordering. For
example, intellectual property laws reinforce the grip of pharmaceu-
ticals corporations on human tissues, family law tolerates or endorses
the commodiﬁcation of gametes and embryos, and bio-ethical legisla-
tion allows various kinds of therapeutic research on (human) embryos.
Attention is (again) directed to the question of how to distinguish per-
sons from things, and it is often argued that new developments imply
a fundamental departure from the ‘original’ legal constitution of the
two categories. In these circumstances it seems especially appropriate
to (re-)consider the making of persons and things in legal settings.
Whatever one makes of the idea that we still have to reckon with the
legacy of Roman law,9 contemporary critiques of technology implicitly
appeal to some notion of a tradition conserved by law. It is therefore
quite timely to explore the fabrication of persons and things from a
historical-anthropological perspective, by paying attention to the dif-
ferent contexts in which these legal categories have been deployed,
and by extending the inquiry beyond Western institutions. The con-
tributions to this book suggest that persons and things have multiple
genealogies, and that their uses are too varied to be reduced to one
single institutional architecture. Each form or transaction constitutes
persons/things in its own way. This has some important implications.
Although the theme of slavery still informs critiques of contemporary
technology (it is often asked, for example, how the ‘ownership’ of genes
or embryos is different from the ownership of slaves) the real problem
is that we can no longer divide the world into the two registers that are
presupposed by any argument against slavery. Now, the problem is that
humans are neither person nor thing, or simultaneously person and thing,
so that law quite literally makes the difference.10 This book develops a
9 This is the perspective adopted by the legal anthropology of Pierre Legendre, which
is presented in his De la socie´te´ comme texte (Fayard, Paris, 2002).
10 There is a resonance between emergent social anxieties and the recent questioning
of the distinction between persons and things in science studies (e.g., Bruno Latour,
Politiques de la nature (La De´couverte, Paris, 1999), esp. chs. 1 and 2).
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number of perspectives on the kind of ‘in-between’ action which pro-
duces legal form, and especially persons and things: network action and
circulating reference, institutional ﬁctions, indexes of attachment, the
manipulation of semantic potential, and so on. And this is precisely
where ethnographic observation complements legal-theoretical analy-
sis. Although not all of the essays are about Western law, and although
one or two have little to say about legal institutions as such, each offers
a resource for re-thinking the composition of persons and things, the
modes in which they are distinguished and (re-)combined by legal insti-
tutions.
One particular sub-institution – ownership – is central to the treat-
ment of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation. To some extent this may be
inevitable, because ownership is so often taken to be the keystone of
legal and social institutions. Certainly, ownership is the context in
which legal doctrine and legal theory have worked out the capacities
or competences of persons in relation to things, and ownership is the
thematic ‘channel’ through which these doctrinal glosses have made
their way into general circulation in society. Ownership is the setting
in which the legal constitution of persons and things has become most
vulnerable to social and technological developments. Through the use
of biomedical technologies, human beings have acquired potentialities
which are actualised in a new set of claims and attachments. Law, and
property law in particular, is asked to construe ‘claims for which no prior
transactional idiom [exists]’.11 This is not just a variation on the old
argument that law lags behind society (in any case, we should now con-
ceive of law in society rather than law and society).12 Western law (or,
more precisely, adjudication) has always taken shape ‘between’ conven-
tion and invention; the paradox arises from the manner in which legal
procedures invent the tradition which they purport only to continue.13
The trouble with biomedicine and biotechnology is that they expose
the paradox for what it is, and a number of our contributors identify
reasons why Western law is ﬁnding it increasingly difﬁcult to manage
contingency in the ‘traditional’ ways. The tension between tradition
11 Marilyn Strathern, ‘Potential Property: Intellectual Rights and Property in Persons’
(1996) 4 Social Anthropology 1, 17–32, at p. 18.
12 See generally Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt,
1995).
13 There is a wonderful illustration of this in F.W.Maitland, ‘Why theHistory of English
law is Not Written’ in H.A.L. Fisher (ed.), The Collected Papers of Frederic William
Maitland (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1911).
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and modernity, as it affects the central contexts of legal personiﬁcation
and reiﬁcation (kinship, ownership, production), is an important theme
in contemporary anthropology. And, even though it is not explicitly
addressed by all of our contributors, it is an essential theme in the col-
lection as a whole; for example, Yan Thomas’ analysis of the Roman
law relating to dead bodies is written against the backdrop of develop-
ments in contemporary law relating to the legal status of the body and
its tissues.
This is just one sense in which our reﬂection on personiﬁcation and
reiﬁcation in law brings together law and anthropology.14 The questions
raised by biotechnology and biomedicine are compounded by the effects
of ‘globalisation’. To begin with, the extension of corporate and insti-
tutional networks re-contextualises cultural forms; the point is not that
the world is becoming progressively more uniform,15 but that globalisa-
tion brings with it new sensitivities to the distinction between local
and global. This is an anthropological question: ‘whether one lives
in Papua New Guinea or in Britain, cultural categories are being dis-
solved and re-formed at a tempo that calls for reﬂection, and that, I
would add, calls for the kind of lateral reﬂection afforded by ethno-
graphic insight’.16 But these sensitivities have important implications
for the (self-)conceptualisation of law. The expansion of legal discourses
beyond their national limits elicits new conceptions of the agency or
fabrication of law.17 How should law be identiﬁed if the old emblems of
state power are no longer available? One response is given in Gunther
Teubner’s interpretation of global law in terms of autopoietic theory,
which develops the old anthropological theme of legal pluralism into
the model of a legal discourse that sustains itself without reference to a
local, national, authority.18 Legal action is re-deﬁned. In place of hier-
archy, sovereignty, and domination, law is construed as a discourse that
consists only in actualisation (its use in communication) rather than
14 The complexities of this mediating ‘and’ cannot be discussed extensively here. See,
Annelise Riles, ‘Representing In-Between: Law, Anthropology, and the Rhetoric of
Interdisciplinarity’ (1994) 3 University of Illinois Law Review 597.
15 A recent issue of the French legal journal Archives de la Philosophie du Droit was enti-
tled ‘L’ame´ricanisation du droit’.
16 See Marilyn Strathern, Property, Substance and Effect (Athlone, London, 1999),
p. 24.
17 On this theme see generally A. Riles, The Network Inside Out (Michigan University
Press, Ann Arbor, 1999).
18 G. Teubner (ed.), Global Law Without a State (Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1997).
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in substance (a corpus of texts or an institution of domination). Again,
the implications of globalisation are more explicitly addressed in cer-
tain contributions, notably those by Murphy, Strathern, and Ku¨chler,
but the new contexts of legal-cultural idioms deﬁne another of the
major thematic horizons of the collection as a whole. Globalisation
joins biotechnology in eliciting new conceptions of the functioning of
legal institutions.
More abstractly, these essays on personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation are
situated at a particular juncture in social theory. To borrow Niklas
Luhmann’s characterisation, one might say that contemporary theo-
ries of society are faced with the difﬁculty of changing their theoretical
‘instrumentation’ from a schema of ‘division’ to a schema of ‘distinc-
tion’.19 Classically – from Aristotle to Hegel, that is – theories divided
the world into foundational oppositions, which were inscribed in the
very texture of the world or in the categories through which the world
was (necessarily) experienced; as in, for example, the basic categories of
space (near/far), time (past/future), or action (intention/effect).20 Tak-
ing the example of time, the classical scheme takes the division between
past and future to be embedded in the categories of experience in such a
way that the presentmoment fromwhich theworld is observed is lodged
in a succession of modal ‘presents’: past present, actual present, and
future present.21 The predicament involved in transforming division-
based schemes into distinction-based forms arises from the recogni-
tion that this linear scheme has become ‘dis-embedded’, so that the
present becomes referable to a particular observer rather than a posi-
tion embedded in a linear succession. In other words, the form of the
distinction is contingent on the observer who draws it: ‘in the case of
distinction, everything depends on how the boundary that divides two
sides (that is, the distinction) is drawn’.22 In the case of time, this is
exempliﬁed by the emergence of the predicament of risk, which arises
19 Niklas Luhmann, Observations on Modernity (Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1998), esp. ch. 4. Luhmann may be more familiar in legal theory than in anthropo-
logical theory, but see (e.g.) SariWastell, ‘Presuming Scale,MakingDiversity’ (2001)
21(2) Critique of Anthropology 185.
20 For a fuller discussion, see Luhmann, Observations on Modernity.
21 See also Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (Routledge, London, 1994).
22 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, at p. 87. This is not just another form of
‘relativism’, if only because the distinction between relativism and objectivity loses
its pertinence when theory begins from the premise of self-reference rather than cor-
respondence.
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when actors become aware that decisions made in this present will have
consequences which will become apparent only in the future present
that will be generated by the decision itself. In Luhmann’s terms, ‘time
and space are only media for possible distinctions, media for possible
observations, but are as unobservable as is the world as a world’.23 The
character of time as a ‘dis-embedded medium’ is illustrated more expres-
sively in Marilyn Strathern’s re-interpretation of the familiar legal-
historical division between status (tradition) and contract (modernity).
Whereas the tradition (sic) presents this division in terms of linear his-
torical evolution, Strathern suggests that we are at ‘both ends of the
continuum at the same time’, so that we might be said to have ‘more
tradition and more modernity at the same time’.24 A form which was
constituted as the historicity of the world becomes the medium for gen-
erating a multiplicity of temporal schemata. And these modes of tem-
poralisation bring with them modes of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation.
Whereas persons and things were the principal exemplars or anchors
of ‘divisionism’ or ‘asymmetry’, the increasing recognition that each
human body or individual is potentially either person or thing brings
with it an awareness that techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation
are constitutive rather than declaratory of the ontology upon which
they are based.
This points to another thematic horizon of the collection: the ques-
tion of potentiality/actuality. The proposition that legal and social con-
ventions constitute the ontological forms which they claim only to
recognise is clearly inconsistent with doctrinal and legal-philosophical
understandings of social action. This has particular implications for the
construal of ownership claims. The economic understanding of prop-
erty is based on the notion of material scarcity; transactions in property
are either concerned with extracting, processing, dividing, or trans-
ferring the ﬁnite substance of the world. In the case of intellectual
property, this understanding implies that the spontaneity of mental
creativity has to be materialised before it can constitute property;25
23 Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, at p. 87. ‘Unobservable’ because, as schemes
which inform observation, they cannot be present to the observer in the moment of
observation.
24 Marilyn Strathern, ‘Enabling Identity? Biology, Choice and the New Reproductive
Technologies’ in Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (eds.), Questions of Cultural Identity
(Sage, London, 1996).
25 ‘The law takes an intangible thing and builds around it a property structure modelled
on the structure which social and legal systems have always applied to some tangible
9
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subjectivity is only legible in material embodiments or supports. In
terms of the question of potentiality/actuality, this implies that own-
ership conventions are coupled to a particular conception of produc-
tion as the means by which potentialities are made actual. This con-
ception of production attributes all creative or originating action to
one or other pole of the division between persons and things. How-
ever, claims to biotechnology patents (to take one example) confront
legal conventions with a kind of originating activity which does not
belong to that causal scheme. As I observe in my contribution, exper-
iments in molecular biology suggest that living organisms emerge from
processes of self-production (autopoiesis or epigenesis). Far from con-
forming to the juridical paradigm of production, which would require
the potentiality of organisms to be lodged in a genetic or evolutionary
programme, these modes of self-production suggest that organisms are
formed in and by the metabolic processes which sustain their pro-
cesses of ontogenesis. Organic production resonates with those models
of social action which have attempted to explain the paradox of emer-
gence (namely, the paradox of self-production).26 My contribution and
that of Susanne Ku¨chler sketch out some of the ways in which new
conceptualisations of biological process suggest new ways of conceiv-
ing attachment, production, creation, and actualisation. Many of the
essays describe legal techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation which,
precisely because they do not express a more fundamental division of
the world into the two registers of persons and things, suggest that law
makes persons and things by actualising undifferentiated potentialities.
And if nothing in this mediumhas an essential, ontological, vocation to
be person or thing, this in turn suggests that the actualisation of poten-
tialities is a radically creative operation.
The essays in the book describe this kind of creativity from differ-
ent perspectives and with reference to different contexts or questions.
The ﬁrst section of the book explores the theme of institutional pro-
duction. The question of institutional creativity is tracked through the
things. By instituting trespassory rules whose content restricts uses of [an] ideational
entity, intellectual property law preserves to an individual or group of individuals
an open-ended set of use-privileges and powers of control and transmission charac-
teristic of ownership interests over tangible items’: J.W. Harris, Property and Justice
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996), p. 44.
26 In social theory the obvious example (again) is the work of Niklas Luhmann, but
the question increasingly arises in the ﬁelds of accounting, management, operational
systems, biology, and so on.
10
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historical anthropology of Roman law (Thomas), through an ethnogra-
phy of France’s Conseil d’Etat (Latour), to an examination of the role
of mass-production in law (Murphy). The second section considers how
legal techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation actualise the poten-
tialities contained in, respectively, semantic forms and the human body.
Mundy and Akarlı analyse the construction of persons and things in
Ottoman-Islamic legal settings, while Strathern, Ku¨chler, and I develop
the theme of bodily potential as a resource for the fabrication of persons
and things.
PERSONS AND THINGS AS INSTITUTIONAL
ARTEFACTS
If the ‘making’ of persons and things is approached by way of a reﬂection
on institutional creativity, two general issues present themselves. First,
the techniques by means of which the law manufactures and deploys
the categories of person and thing can be seen as deﬁning the peculiar
nature of (legal-)institutional action. Following the example of Roman
law, one might say that the identity of legal institutions consists in the
way they build conventions and transactions round the cardinal points
of person and thing. But this mode of institutional action also identi-
ﬁes law in the sense of distinguishing it from other social discourses or
institutions. In that sense, and at least in the ﬁrst instance, there is no
warrant for extending the action of the persons and things invented by
law beyond the horizon of the institution. Minimally, and most impor-
tantly, this means that the legal person has no necessary correspondence
to social, psychological, or biological individuality. In an age which
still identiﬁes personal fulﬁlment or emancipation with the acquisition
and defence of legal rights, this might seem almost perverse. The con-
struction of the legal persona of the author illustrates how legal per-
sonality is taken as an attribute of ‘real’ individuals, and how in turn
legal doctrine reinforces those expectations. For example, by consti-
tuting the author as an owner of ideas, intellectual property law sta-
bilised and ‘naturalised’ the romantic conception of the spontaneously
creative individual,27 and this relation between legal personality and
27 ‘The principal institutional embodiment of the author-work relation is copyright,
which not only makes possible the proﬁtable publishing of books, but also, by endow-
ing it with legal reality, produces and afﬁrms the very identity of the author as
author . . . What we here observe is a twin birth, the simultaneous emergence in
11
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natural individuality still seems self-evident.28 One of the advantages
of anthropological distantiation is that it problematises assumptions of
this sort. For example, the anthropology of Roman law reveals a mode
of institutional action – or, more precisely, a technique of personiﬁca-
tion and reiﬁcation – which suggests that what are taken as overarching
social categories (the sex, gender, kinship, capacity, or creativity of per-
sons, and the quiddity of things) are specialised artefacts which are not
predicated on some general social ontology.
Institutional fictions
Yan Thomas’ essay on the category of the ‘pure’ in Roman law proposes
the most restrictive speciﬁcation of legal institutions. This contribu-
tion should be set in the context of Thomas’ historical anthropology of
Roman law, which has been developed through a number of now cel-
ebrated studies in institutional technique. Reductively, one might say
the central or fundamental question is that of institutional reference:
how do legal categories relate to the world ‘outside’ the institution? For
Thomas, the character of legal institutions is expressed by the Roman
law technique of ﬁctions.29 According to the modern doctrinal under-
standing of proof and procedure, ﬁctions and presumptions are devices
which assist in making decisions in conditions of uncertainty. Typi-
cally, presumptions are presented as crude, pragmatic, instruments of
probabilistic reasoning: as encrypted experience. For example, the old
the discourse of the law of the proprietary author and the literary work. The two
concepts are bound to each other. To assert one is to imply the other, and together,
like the twin suns of a binary star locked into orbit about each other, they deﬁne the
centre of the modern literary system’: Mark Rose, ‘The Author as Proprietor: Don-
aldson v. Becket and the Genealogy of Modern Authorship’ in Brad Sherman and
Alain Strowel (eds.), Of Authors and Origins (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 23,
at pp. 28 and 39.
28 David Saunders summarises this point of view as follows: ‘A certain habit of mind
remains attached to the notion of an essential person, one which in terms of the
history of authorship would typically be moral or aesthetic, the locus of a subjectiv-
ity deeper and more general than mere institutional constructs such as the juridical
persons of copyright holder or obscene libeller. Unlike them, so it might seem, this
subjectivity would not depend on attributes formed in a technical apparatus rest-
ing on executed statutes and judicial determinations . . . Surely there has to be a
fundamental personality, the person itself, that constitutes the necessary ground of
legal personalities, the anchorage on which they ultimately depend’: Authorship and
Copyright (Routledge, London, 1992), p. 12.
29 Yan Thomas, ‘Fictio legis: L’empire de la ﬁction romaine et ses limites me´die´vales’
(1995) 21 Droits 17.
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repertoire of presumptions used in family law to determine paternity –
an example which is especially apposite because changes in the use of
the old presumptions have renewed anthropological interests in legal
determinations of kinship30 – can be seen as attempts to second-guess
biology. The probabilistic quality of presumptions becomes somewhat
more tenuous in the case of something like the commorientes principle,31
and it disappears altogether where (irrebuttable) presumptions are used
to impose normative objectives.32 Moreover, one might say that, pre-
cisely because ﬁctions and presumptions are used in the absence of any
determinate facts from which to draw evidential inferences, they are
not really ‘evidence’ or ‘argument’.33 But the important point is that
whether they are seen as probabilistic devices or as normative trumps,
their role is understood in terms of the ideal of a proper relation of corre-
spondence between norm and nature. Fictions and presumptions work
within the division between law and fact, or between legal propositions
and the ‘things’ to which they refer.
Against this background, Thomas focuses on the technique of legal
ﬁctions in Roman law, and proposes two correctives to the modern
understanding. First, there is a categorical distinction between ﬁction
and presumptions: presumptions (even irrebuttable presumptions) are
used where there is uncertainty as to the true facts; ﬁctions are used
where there is certainty as to the falsity of the proposition asserted
by the ﬁction. The eclipse of this classical distinction between ﬁc-
tions and presumptions has obscured our view of law’s original insti-
tutional technique. Precisely because they took shape against a back-
ground negation of ‘reality’, ﬁctions in Roman law implied something
very different from the modern idea of a correspondence between norm
and nature. Rather, the construction of Roman law was based on ‘a
radical non-relation between the institution and the world of natural
30 See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, Deﬁning the Family: Law, Technology, and Reproduction in
an Uneasy Age (New York University Press, New York, 1997).
31 Where two heirs die together in circumstances in which it is impossible to establish
which of the two predeceased the other, the descent of property follows the ‘natural’
principle that the elder of the two died ﬁrst.
32 One example is the traditional presumption of criminal law that boys under the age
of 14 are incapable of rape.
33 The upshot is that presumptions are not a mode of evidential reasoning: ‘Presump-
tions are not in themselves either argument or evidence, although for the time being
they accomplish the result of both’: James Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence at the Common Law (Boston, 1898), p. 336.
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facts [la radicale de´liaison de l’institutionnalite´ d’avec le monde des choses de
la nature]’.34 The institution had effects in the world, but these were
achieved by an ongoing negation of reality. The operation of ﬁctions
in Roman law can be illustrated by reference to the technique of ‘nega-
tive ﬁctions’; these were ﬁctions which declared that real, actual, events
had not occurred (as distinct from ‘positive’ ﬁctions, which declared
something to exist which had no existence in ‘fact’). For example, the
lex Cornelia of 81 BC held that, despite the general rule that Roman
citizens lost their testamentary capacity when they were taken captive
by an enemy, citizens who died as captives were nevertheless deemed,
by operation of ﬁction, not have been captured at all, to have died as
free men, and therefore to have retained their capacity to make a valid
will.35 What is essential is that the law did not just ﬁctionalise the facts
so as to deny the truth of capture, but that the ﬁction also effected a kind
of institutional ‘double negation’. The role of the ﬁction was to coun-
termand the prior rule as to testamentary capacity, so that the ﬁction
negated a pre-existing law by way of a declaration as to the facts. In a
sense one might say that the ﬁction articulated a relation of the institu-
tion to itself: the ﬁction equiparates36 the institution itself to an exter-
nal reality which, ostensibly, it negates. Fictions therefore performed
a kind of institutional involution in which differences or distinctions
were internal to the institution itself:
The difference between law and fact is not a difference of fact but one
of law, and this is what deﬁnes the essence of the institution, and what
makes ﬁctions so revelatory of the artiﬁciality of the institution.37
The axis relays the institution to itself rather than to the ‘real’ world.
So, although it might have been easier simply to validate the wills of
citizens who died in captivity, without employing any kind of ﬁction,
Roman law preferred ﬁctions. With each successive involution, ‘the law
became increasingly isolated by these ever more complex constructions,
always widening the gap between itself and reality [le re´el]’.38 By means
of these concatenated negations, ﬁctions preserved the notion of exter-
nal reference, but only as a resource for an ever more involuted process
of institutional self-reference.
34 Thomas, ‘Fictio legis’, at p. 20. 35 Ibid. at pp. 22–4.
36 Equiparation being itself a legal technique of ﬁctionalisation.
37 Thomas, ‘Fictio legis’, at p. 35. 38 Ibid. at p. 34.
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Thomas’s approach to legal institutions has some afﬁnity with the
style of legal anthropology developed by Louis Gernet.39 For example,
Gernet’s celebrated essay on time and temporality in ancient (Greek
and Roman) law demonstrates how these institutional regimes were
indifferent to what would now be regarded as ‘real’ facts in the world.
One of the examples given concerns the Roman law action of vindicatio,
which was the formula used to claim ownership of some object. It was
therefore one of the key techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation
in Roman law, an institutional device which delimited the respective
capacities and competences of person and thing. The modern inter-
preter might ﬁnd the formula for the action of vindicatio entirely absurd.
When he is challenged by his adversary to show cause or title (‘I ask you
to justify your claim [postulo anne dicas qua ex causa vindicaveris]’), the
claimant merely refers to the ritual words with which he initiated his
action (‘I established my right by imposing my claim [ius feci sicut vin-
dictam imposui]’). So, whereas we would expect the claimant to invoke
some prior act or event as the warrant of his claim, the claimant grounds
the ‘substance’ of the claim within the convention itself, rather than in
the world of facts lying outside the institutional drama of the action.
Law ‘consisted in action [le droit est essentiellement action]’40 because
rights – and, importantly, their relation to the facts which were their
warrant – had no ‘ontology’ other that which was granted to them by
the drama of the trial process.
Thomas emphasises the historical or anthropological speciﬁcity of
the institution the better to demystify modern expectations of what law
can achieve. Although there is a stronger claim – implied in the propo-
sition that legal technique was ‘the most durable and the most histor-
ically adaptable form of intelligence produced by the Roman world’ –
the polemical charge of his account is essentially directed against any
assumption that the legal forms of person and thing can somehow
39 There is one very important qualiﬁcation to be made here. Gernet’s doctoral thesis
of 1917 (recently republished as Recherches sur le de´veloppement de la pense´e juridique et
morale enGre`ce (AlbinMichel, Paris, 2001) cites Durkheim as its principal inﬂuence.
His later essays are collected in Droit et institutions en Gre`ce antique (Flammarion,
Paris, 1982) and Anthropologie de la Gre`ce antique (Flammarion, Paris, 1982). Tim
Murphy observes (Chapter 4) that Durkheim is a major proponent of the view that
‘law is one of the most important, or the most institutionalised, way in which the fea-
tures of society are apprehended in thought’. Thomas’s view of law’s social functions
is clearly not Durkheimian.
40 Gernet, Droit et institutions en Gre`ce antique, at p. 122.
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embody or implement general social objectives. Contrary to the gen-
eral political expectation that the legal deﬁnition of persons or things
might secure the integrity of environments, genes, or embryos, and con-
trary to the theoretical understanding of legal institutions as discur-
sive palimpsests in which succeeding social ideas inscribe themselves,
Thomas insists on the ‘cold, technical’ character of legal rationality.
In his essay on res religiosae, this critical approach is focused on the
interpretation of the category of (im)purity in certain versions of the
anthropology of religion. The essay is a case study of a particular form
of res religiosa – the tomb. Whereas one would expect the laws relat-
ing to tombs and dead bodies to be saturated with social and religious
meanings surrounding death and the afterlife, Thomas shows how the
relevant prescriptions, while not being entirely indifferent to gener-
alised beliefs, were developed autonomously. The tomb and its contents
were deﬁned by an institutional technique that was concerned with
two interlinked questions: ﬁrst, the problem of fabricating a permanent
institutional entity from the various contingencies which surrounded
the practice of burial; and, secondly, that of deﬁning this institutional
res in such a way as to secure and delimit the perpetual memorial foun-
dations which were attached to tombs, and which beneﬁted from sig-
niﬁcant ﬁscal concessions. Crudely, one might say that the legal con-
stitution of tombs had more to do with tax avoidance than religious
belief. As Thomas puts it: ‘In Rome, law and legal rules were not the
expression of [religious] taboos. Rather, they were instruments by which
taboos were transformed into a set of techniques for the management
of inheritance funds’ (Yan Thomas, Chapter 2).
The ﬁrst, ostensibly unremarkable, observation is that a tomb was
constituted as a res religiosa by the inscription or incorporation of a body
within it. In Roman law, a tomb was not apprehended as a purely incor-
poreal symbol or sign of the deceased person; rather, the res in question
being an eminently corporeal res it had to be predicated on a mate-
rial corpus. In Roman law doctrine, this was what made the difference
between the constitution of a res religiosa as distinct from a res sancta.
How then was the materiality of body deﬁned? Many of the difﬁculties
of reifying body have been accentuated or multiplied by the advent of
modern technologies, and are exempliﬁed in debates concerning the
removal of tissues or gametes post mortem. In the case of Roman law,
the difﬁculties arose from the circumstances of death or the peculiarity
of cultural practices relating to dead bodies. For example, in the (not
unusual) case of a body which had been dismembered on the battle
16
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ﬁeld, which part, or what proportion of the parts, sufﬁced to constitute
a body? Again, this was in part a question of social belief or interpre-
tation (in the Roman imagination the head was the chief element of
the body) and in part a question of ﬁscal policy – if a single body were
allowed to generate a number of (protected) tombs there would clearly
be a number of consequences. At what point did the legal protections
associated with the status of a body as a res religiosa begin? In the Roman
world, a bodymight be detained by creditors of the deceased, and held as
a form of illegitimate lien or security for repayment of the alleged debt.
Could a regime of protection based upon the rites of burial be extended
(anticipatedly, as it were) to protect a body that had not yet been sanc-
tiﬁed or ‘memorialised’? More generally, how was the law to deal with
the organic process of decay? A tomb had to contain the material cor-
pus that was the body, but the actual substance was variable: ashes,
bones, decaying ﬂesh. Clearly the problem of deﬁning what counted
as ‘body’ had practical implications. Lawyers might have to determine
whether bodies could be exhumed and re-interred, and graves (and the
bodies they contained) might have been violated in some way. But the
more fundamental question was how, doctrinally, the res to which legal
prescriptions referred should be deﬁned. Granted that a material cor-
pus was essential to the constitution of a res religiosa, how should this
‘matter’ be deﬁned? What is important here is that legal technique by-
passed any reﬂection on the actual condition of the remains found in
tombs, and reduced the properly buried body, whatever its actual con-
dition, to a state of permanence. The body was ‘instituted’ in the sense
that institutional technique abstracted it from the ﬂux of real (that is,
social, biological, or historical) time so as to immobilise it: ‘the impres-
sion of permanence that was produced by the Roman law relating to
tombs, by means of its norms of inviolability, inalienability, and impre-
scriptibility, clothed a corporeal entity, thereby rendering it immune
to the depradations of time’ (Thomas, Chapter 2). The body was, one
might say, a form of institutional ﬁction. This was an essential technique
of reiﬁcation, by which bodily remains were turned into institutional
‘things’.
So, far from conﬁrming the supposed responsiveness of Roman legal
institutions to social beliefs, this example of tombs and dead bodies sug-
gests that law was operationally autonomous. Although the categorisa-
tion of tombs as res religiosae implied their categorisation as ‘impure’ in
Roman law, this had little to do with religious beliefs or taboos centred
on the impurity of dead bodies. In law, the distinction between pure and
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impure was deployed to differentiate those objects which were open to
commercial exchange from those which were not. In other words, they
were institutional categories which did no more that facilitate particu-
lar transactions: ‘The “profane” or the “pure” were not immediate and
intuitive observations of religious consciousness, no more than were
the “sacred”, the “religious” or the “holy”, which were strictly deﬁned
institutional categories’ (Thomas, Chapter 2). The question of the
(im)purity of the body was elided by means of a technique which,
having ﬁctionalised the corpus, then focused on the res constituted by
its inscription: the tomb. This institutional arrangement was character-
istically Roman; the law protected the tomb rather than the body, the
container rather than its contents: ‘The jurisprudence relating to the
violation of tombs elaborated the basic principle that it was the tomb,
rather than the body it contained, that beneﬁted from religious sta-
tus’. These illustrations give a close-textured picture of the fabrication
of things in classical Roman law, and exemplify the kind of ‘innate
autonomy’41 that characterised its institutions.
Reference and production
Bruno Latour’s approach to legal reference is a development of his
ethnography of the scientiﬁc laboratory, in which the old conﬁgura-
tion of persons and things, or subjects and objects, is displaced by the
concepts of hybrids, translation, humans/non-humans, and associative
action.42 These concepts have now become quite inﬂuential, so it may
be sufﬁcient to point to one particular illustration; namely, the con-
cept of ‘circulating reference’ that is developed in Latour’s case study
of soil collection in the Amazon basin.43 This account of the collec-
tion and analysis of soil samples describes a process of displacement,
in which each successive inscription becomes a referent for the next
41 See generally Thomas, Fictio legis.
42 The classic text is Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Harvester, London,
1997).
43 Bruno Latour, ‘Circulating Reference: Sampling Soil in the Amazon Forest’ in Pan-
dora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1999), p. 24: ‘The old settlement started from a gap between words and
the world, and then tried to construct a tiny footbridge over this chasm through a
risky correspondence between what were understood as totally different ontological
domains – language and nature. I want to show that there is neither correspondence,
nor gaps, nor even two distinct ontological domains, but an entirely different phe-
nomenon: circulating reference’.
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signifying inscription: the set of superimposed maps, photographs, and
coloured diagrams which domesticate the forest terrain, turning it into
a rudimentary laboratory with controllable parameters; the extraction
of samples by reference to this rudimentary grid, by means of a device
which always takes samples of the same size; the immediate localisation
of each sample by means of a record of provenance based on detailed
co-ordinates; the collection of the ﬁnal array of samples into a sort of
multi-sectioned cabinet or specimen box in which soil distribution can
be appreciated synoptically, and from which hypothetical patterns can
be elicited; and, ﬁnally, the classiﬁcation of soils according to a colour
chart, which again accommodates the ‘facts’ precipitated so far to a new
medium of signiﬁcation – the colour code used to determine how rich
in a clay a given sample might be. This is a story of continual displace-
ment or ‘transportation’, of the production of reference by means of the
gradual precipitation of an ever more determinate ‘fact’ from the trans-
portation of reference through a chain of inscriptions:
Our philosophical tradition has been mistaken in wanting to make phe-
nomena the meeting point between things-in-themselves and categories
of human understanding . . . Phenomena are not found at the meeting
point between things and the forms of the human mind; phenomena are
what circulates all along the reversible chain of transformations, at each
step losing some properties to gain others that render them compatible
with already-established centers of calculation. Instead of growing from
two ﬁxed extremities toward a stable meeting point in the middle, the
unstable reference grows from the middle toward the ends, which are con-
tinually pushed further away.44
Latour’s notion of ‘transportation’ expresses a mode of emergence in
which the reference potential of words and things is not innate, but is
constituted by the process which actualises that potential: ‘Knowledge
does not reﬂect a real external world that it resembles via mimesis, but
rather a real interior world, the coherence and continuity of which it
helps to ensure’.45 This is the science studies version of Thomas’ anal-
ysis of the involuted ﬁctions which deﬁned the autonomy of Roman
law.
Interestingly, Thomas’ anthropology of Roman legal institutions ﬁg-
ures in Latour’s approach to science studies because legal technique –
or, more precisely, procedural or legal rhetoric – supplies a prototype of
the kind of hybrid(ising) action that is at work in ‘circulating reference’.
44 Latour, ‘Circulating Reference’, at pp. 71–2. 45 Ibid. at p. 58.
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Things, and, for that matter, persons, are essential to this connection.
Thomas’ genealogy of the term ‘thing’ (chose in French, but one can do
similar things with the English word ‘thing’)46 traces its emergence back
through the Roman law conception of a res to the term causa, which
signiﬁed an issue, debate, or matter at hand. The point is that a term
which now signiﬁes an ontological form was once the name for a provi-
sional nexus which held social or legal actors together in a kind of ﬂuid
or emergent bond.47 In that sense, chose/causawas the name for a princi-
ple of emergent association between actors; or, to use Latour’s favoured
terminology, between humans and non-humans. Thus, Thomas’ legal-
anthropological etymology reveals the role of the thing as an ‘index to
the particular collective that one is seeking to bring together’ [‘l’indice
du collectif que l’on cherche a` rassembler’].48 To return to the starting
point of the introduction, one might say that juridical form, far from
being the conﬁrmation of long-standing models of action and creation,
illustrates the modes of ‘networked’ associative action which animates
laboratories, and social networks in general. But at the same time,
Latour’s ethnographic attention to law suggests limitations to this anal-
ogy between legal and scientiﬁc production. Both may be animated by
‘hybridising’ action, but conventions of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation
are deployed very differently in each domain, so that humans and non-
humans take on different roles or functions in each. Latour’s essay in
this volume suggests that the distinction between subjectivity (persons)
and objectivity (things) marks the difference between law and science.
In fact, given Latour’s notion of ‘hybridising’ associations of human and
non-human agents, neither subjectivity nor objectivity is quite right.
The essay talks about ‘subjectiﬁcation’ and ‘objectity’; the terms evoke
two contrasting techniques for apprehending and transporting ‘facts’.
In one sense, the production of persons and things in legal settings
is an example of ‘circulating reference’. The legal ‘laboratory’ to which
Latour turns his ethnographic attention – the Conseil d’Etat – is a very
peculiar kind of legal institution. As France’s supreme constitutional
court, it is a unique fusion of legal, political, and administrative cul-
tures. A court can be a laboratory in the sameway as an area of the forest
46 See, e.g., Martin Heidegger, ‘The Thing’ in Poetry, Language, Thought (Harper, Row,
New York, 1971).
47 See Bruno Latour, Politiques de la nature, pp. 88–9 and note at p. 316, citing Yan
Thomas ‘Res, chose et patrimoine: note sur le rapport sujet-objet en droit romain’
(1980) Archives de la philosophie du droit 413.
48 Latour, Politiques de la nature, at p. 351.
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ﬂoor can be a laboratory: as soon as one has the ingredients of circulat-
ing reference as an accumulation of layers of signiﬁcation one has the
elements of a laboratory. But in the case of law, the process of accumula-
tion largely happens between the covers of a ﬁle: the effective modes of
transportation are ‘ﬁles, more ﬁles, nothing but ﬁles’. The scope of law’s
referential chains is conﬁned to what can be encompassed and appre-
ciated by perusing the ﬁle. And this is the essential point of difference
between science and law. Science is also a textual activity – its modes
of transportation depend upon the accumulation and transformation
of inscriptions. But in science researchers are always concerned with
multiplying transformations, of gaining additional perspectives on the
‘original’ facts constituted by circulating reference, whereas in law the
chains of reference are sharply cut down by the procedural deﬁnitions of
relevance (what Latour calls ‘the limits imposed by the adversarial logic
of the case’) and by the availability of techniques of standardisation
which, thanks to its history of professionalisation and routinisation,
allow the law to resolve the facts by reference to devices such as the sig-
nature. To take one of Latour’s examples, there is a world of difference
between establishing whether a drugs dealer threatened with deporta-
tion ‘really’ has dependent children, and asking whether his lawyers
had made a claim to the existence of children in due procedural form.
In law, ‘facts are things that one tries to get rid of as quickly as possi-
ble, in order to move on to something else, namely the relevant point
of law’ (Bruno Latour, Chapter 3); that is why lawyers and judges
work only with the world represented in the case ﬁle. Like the more
complicated layering of scientiﬁc inscriptions, the case ﬁle could be
described as a map of the world. But in science all of the action takes
place in the ‘middle’, between map and territory, so that there is a
dynamic tension between the two registers of reference. Any ‘topo-
graphic’ sign is liable to be re-contextualised or re-drawn in the light
of new information about the territory. In short, science is a process
of reﬂexive learning. In the case of law, by contrast, the map entirely
supplants the territory, and information about the territory is admitted
only in such a way as to prompt an involutionary re-composition of the
fabric of the law. Latour describes involution in terms of a model of
qualiﬁcation rather than ﬁctionalisation. The formula for qualiﬁcation
(‘A is an instance of B as it is deﬁned by article C’ (Latour, Chapter 3))
describes a discursive operation in which, rather like the Roman law
technique of ﬁctio legis, apprehension of the ‘facts’ is always condi-
tioned by a normative premise. Inquiry into the facts is conﬁned to the
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question whether the facts are such as to trigger the application of
the rule; and, as Latour observes, this is a mode of involution rather
than just a mode of classiﬁcation because qualiﬁcation is less about
cognition than it is about steering institutional action: ‘this kind of
ordering is of assistance in logistics rather than in judgment’ (Latour,
Chapter 3).
This is what makes the difference between scientiﬁc ‘objectity’ and
legal ‘objectivity’. The engagement of the scientist is based on a pecu-
liarly circular form of object relation; a different and much more expan-
sive mode of involution, one might say. If there is a juridical character
to laboratory science, it is not that science fulﬁls the common legalistic
notion of what ‘objective’ knowledge is. Rather, it is that the object – or
non-human – plays a quasi-judicial role; it ultimately ‘passes judgment
on what is said of it’. That is, the object is in two places at once. In
one role it is the thing studied – the object that is framed and animated
by the textual and technical apparatus of the laboratory. In another, it
determines the truth of the claims made in respect of it by laboratory
researchers in their scientiﬁc articles. Here, the particular character of
circulating reference in science is important. In science, the movement
of ‘referential’ transportation is reversible. The accumulation of inscrip-
tions is relayed in such a way that any subsequent critic of the experi-
ment in question could recreate the array of instruments, reagents, com-
puters, and expertise that enabled the behaviour of the relevant fact
to be observed, scrutinising the process for assumptions or tolerances
that might have induced the object to perform in one way rather than
another. Indeed, until this process of reconstruction has taken place, the
‘truth value’ of experimental conclusions or hypotheses remains inde-
terminate. Truth is settled after the event, once the experiment has
been written up and published, by means of a process in which its con-
clusions are tested by returning to the ‘original’ object. To sharpen the
analogy between the tribunal and the laboratory, Latour describes the
dual role of the scientiﬁc object by reference to the ancient or medi-
aeval judicial ordeal, in which the behaviour of an object revealed the
innermost truth about an accused. Similarly, the ‘subjective’ expecta-
tions and attachments of the scientist hang on the response given by
the experimental object. Latour characterises this mode of engagement
as ‘objectity’.
By contrast, ‘the strange thing about legal objectivity is that it is
quite literally object-less, and is sustained entirely by the production
of a mental state, a bodily hexis’ (Latour, Chapter 3). This adds another
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dimension to the theme of the fabrication of persons and things. The
contrast between law and science is also ethological in the sense that
it draws out two ways of being in the world, two kinds of behavioural
stance or attitude on the part of the humans engaged in the two respec-
tive practices. Latour nicely captures the differences between the two
environments, beginning with laboratory scientists:
They resemble a group of gamblers huddled around a cockﬁght on which
each has staked his fortune; they may not be shouting or screaming
like madmen, but there can be no question but that they are passion-
ately interested in the fate of their neuron, and in what it might have
to say for itself . . . On the other hand, passion is the least appropriate
term to describe the attitude of judges [conseillers] in the course of a hear-
ing. There is no libido sciendi. No word is pronounced more loudly than
another. Leaning back in their chairs, attentive or asleep, interested or
indifferent, the judges always keep themselves at a distance.
Laboratory scientists are entirely in the thrall of the experimental
object, so much so that their own ‘subjective’ affects and expectations
are invested in the texture of the object itself. That is ‘objectity’: a mode
of engagement that is strangely ‘subject-less’. Law, on the other hand,
produces objectivity by knowing as little as possible about the object.
Objectivity is an ethological effect because it consists in the produc-
tion of a particular kind of bodily and environmental tone. For exam-
ple, the idea of ‘due hesitation’: the choice of phrases, tones of voice,
or procedural formulae in the Conseil d’Etat is informed by the silent
strategy of always appearing to give the fullest consideration to a case
(according to the formula of qualiﬁcation) before the ﬁnal judgment
falls. But ‘consideration’ is an effect of institutional aesthetics and bod-
ily hexis rather than a genuinely cognitive enterprise because it is gen-
erated by the ‘accumulation of micro-procedures which manage to pro-
duce detachment and keep doubt at bay’ (Latour, Chapter 3). In that
sense, objectivity depends upon a mode of subjectiﬁcation: the fabrica-
tion of things (objective facts) in law correlates to the production of
persons (institutional personae). Both science and law are constituted
by hybridising action and circulating reference, but they are differen-
tiated by their respective ways of sculpting the roles of humans and
non-humans. In that sense, the contrast between legal and scientiﬁc
‘laboratories’ sharpens Latour’s theory of associative action.
In Tim Murphy’s essay, the difference between scientiﬁc and legal
reference is just as essential. Citing Niklas Luhmann, Murphy observes
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that ‘the law cannot be used as a machine for the investigation of
truths, or for the discovery of intelligent solutions to problems’ (Tim
Murphy, Chapter 4). In terms of the question of making persons and
things, this prompts a somewhat polemical engagement with the ques-
tion of what actually constitutes ‘making’ in legal settings. Rather than
emphasising the peculiarity of legal technique, Murphy suggests that
law has to be seen as an instance of a more general form of production or
technology; because production in contemporary society implies mass-
production, much of modern law is itself mass-produced and/or posi-
tivised. What is important, if one develops the sub-theme of involu-
tion, recursion, or ‘re-potentialisation’, is that mass-production implies
a collapse of the division that underwrites the classical understanding of
production. Ordinarily, industrial production is understood as a process
in which an inventive design or an authorial intention is given shape
in a mechanical form. This implies a relation in which the output or
effect is commanded by the design, according to a linear process of cau-
sation. Machines, or mechanically-produced artefacts, are deﬁned by
their makers. However, Murphy’s approach to mass-production implies
a relation in which the essence of each product or artefact is lodged
in feedback loops or processes of ‘re-entry’. The ‘nature’ of the prod-
uct or output is deﬁned by a design which is always in the process of
being re-designed in the light of information gathered from the per-
formance of the product. The best example is that of biotechnolog-
ical mass-production.49 Similarly, the autonomy of legal institutions
or discourses has to be seen as a process in which legal artefacts (per-
sons and things, one might say) are just nexes in an ongoing process
of ‘re-potentialisation’, in which the formative design of the artefact
is always hostage to the evaluation of the performance of the artefact.
This is what Murphy suggests in his reference to the ‘mobility’ of legal
schemata:
Mobile grids are set in motion or, more exactly, are in motion all the
time – there is no beginning and no reason to suppose an end to this
kind of process – and these grids and their shifting contents are what
the law and its essential technologies of reports, indexes, computer-based
data storage and retrieval makes. These grid formations and classiﬁcatory
schemes feed back into the processes of adjudication and legislating and
law teaching via textbooks, reading lists, journal articles and the world
49 Here, Murphy cites Knorr-Cetina (Chapter 4 at p.).
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wide web. So we can say that one answer to the question what does the
law make is that it makes grids – ways of organising what through its
epistemic ﬁlters it considers to be facts, including facts about the state of
the law.50
In one sense, this idea of ‘mobility’ implies learning, and therefore
a greater degree of openness of the institution to the social than is
suggested by Thomas’ analysis of Roman law (though here, ‘openness’
should be understood in terms of the systems theory formula that open-
ness is possible only on the basis of ‘closure’).51
THE PERSONIFICATION AND REIFICATION OF
POTENTIALITIES
The remaining contributions to the volume explore the construction
of legal conventions or transactions by developing two related themes.
The ﬁrst concerns the way in which social themes or events are folded
into legal discourses to develop what might be called the ‘semantic
potentiality’ of law. Secondly, with reference to the role played by
biotechnology and biomedicine in the problematisation of ‘traditional’
legal conventions, our contributors develop analogies which explore
the medium or substance which has become most problematic: namely,
‘body’ as a peculiar stock of potentiality.52
Semantic potential
Thomas’ theory of the innate autonomy of Roman legal institutions
develops the notion that legal concepts or categories are the resources
fromwhich res and personae are fabricated. The competences and capac-
ities of persons and things are contained in the semantic potential of
these categories, and are drawn out by rhetorical techniques which
actualise the potential of a given convention or formula by means of
argumentation. In that sense, the entities that surface in legal proce-
dure are really artefacts of the procedure itself rather than descriptions
of external social or psychological events. One might say that the insti-
tutional force of Roman law consisted in its capacity to capture ‘real’
50 See Murphy, Chapter 4.
51 See generally Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford University Press, Stanford,
1997), ch. 5.
52 Dropping the article, in the manner of Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of
the Body (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988) is one way of highlighting
this potentiality.
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persons and things in these conventional artefacts. So, for example, the
imposition of legal liability depended not upon some exploration of the
psychological motivations or processes of the individual, but upon
the ability of the advocate to ensnare an individual in a formula which
was ‘prefabricated’ in the sense that it was prepared by rhetorical inven-
tion entirely within the time of the trial:
The very idea that one might be bound by one’s actions was foreign to
Roman thought, which treated subjects as the accessories of actions. The
relationship implied by the formula noxae se obligare (meaning ‘to bind
oneself to one’s action’ and not ‘by one’s action’) is quite the opposite
of that which deﬁnes personal obligations in the contemporary sense.
The misdeed (noxa) tightened retroactively around the guilty person.
The latter was not so much an agent, as the captive subject of the
wrong, tied or bound to his action; the point is not that he was not
required to answer for it, but that in a very speciﬁc sense that he was
held in the grip of the law: actione teneri, meaning: to be held by a legal
action.53
Thus, the Roman legal imaginary was one in which persons and
things were the (semantic) incidents of legal formulae or conventions.
The ‘action’ of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation happened entirely within
the institution, and they expressed what might be called encrypted
institutional potential.
Engin Akarlı’s and Martha Mundy’s illustrations from Ottoman-
Islamic law suggest variations on this notion of semantic potential. In
contrast to Thomas’ picture of a strictly autonomous institution, Akarlı
emphasises that the place of adjudication in the ‘Ottoman-Islamic legal
ethos’ was such that ‘courts made and remade the laws, in the practical
sense of the word as binding provisions, with the participation of those
actors to whom the provisions would apply’ (Engin Akarlı, Chapter 6).
The legal records suggest that even in the imperial court, doctrinal
forms and conventions were the media through which law accommo-
dated, and through which it accommodated itself to, the increasing
social complexity of claims. The study focuses on the category of gedik
in Ottoman jurisprudence and practice, describing the process of evolu-
tion through which the concept was loaded with a semantic potential
which allowed it to hold a number of quite heterogeneous elements.
Gedik described the tools of an artisan’s trade, the market position
53 Yan Thomas, ‘Acte, agent, socie´te´: Sur l’homme coupable dans la pense´e juridique
romaine’ (1977) 24 Archives de la philosophie du droit 63, at p. 71.
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enjoyed through the use of those tools, the participation of the artisan
in a guild, the certiﬁcate which constituted security for debts contracted
by the artisan, or an item of inheritance. The complexity of the claims
within this arrangement, the shifting matrix of persons and things, is
illustrated by the example of the problems faced by merchants dealing
with artisans who defaulted on their obligations. In these circumstances
the gedik certiﬁcate might turn out to be a worthless security because
nothing in the structure of guilds prevented an artisan from alienating
the assets indexed by the certiﬁcate or from leaving the guild to set up
as an artisan elsewhere. The doctrinal construction of the rights and
obligations articulated by the category of gedik therefore implied the
precipitation of persons and things out of a form which could poten-
tially be either, depending on the nature of the claim. For example, as
with any corporate entity, this involved a complex bundle of personiﬁ-
cations: the agency of the corporate persona acting as such vis-a`-vis the
outside world, the agency of that person with respect to its members, the
personae taken on by members inter se, the capacities and competences
of artisans vis-a`-vis merchants or secular and religious institutions. This
was not just a question of resolving the corporation into its component
elements, because that is a more complex business than a mere enu-
meration of roles might suggest.54 Rather it is about the creation of per-
sons/things out of what might be termed a ‘multiplicity’. For example,
in determining the right to inherit a gedik, legal doctrine had to reckon
with the fact that an artisan as the holder of a gedik was simultaneously a
member of the guild, an economic actor in his own right, a member of
a family, and a representative of a lineage. The personal relations and
attachments compressed into this multiplicity could be actualised by
techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation which would be deployed
differently, and to different effect, where the nature of the claim was dif-
ferent. That is the sense in which the gedik was (like the human body in
the contributions discussed below) a semantic form from which either
persons or things could be actualised.
Martha Mundy’s essay is a companion study in the construction of
semantic potential. It concerns a question of doctrine: did the holder of
an administrative grant of land inMamluk/Ottoman Egypt have a prop-
erty right which was capable of alienation? The grants in question were
54 For an example of how a single persona can be split into a number of different exis-
tences, see the discussion of Marx and Rousseau in Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle
(Blackwell, Oxford, 1992).
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usually made to military ofﬁcers or religious functionaries, who were
allowed to take a proportion of the tax revenues due to the sovereign.
In that sense, the grant could be seen as remuneration for service, and as
a right revocable by the sovereign at any time. In these circumstances,
could a military holder alienate his right by renting it out, effectively
treating it as a usufructuary property right? Two closely-related doctri-
nal issues arose at that point. First, was the right to be conceived in
terms of property or ofﬁce? that is, was it a right attached to (or reiﬁed
in) the land, or was it an incident of the grantee’s ofﬁce? This ques-
tion was complicated by the fact that the grant might be revoked by
the sovereign at any point, so that the res in question was of precarious
status and undeﬁned duration. Secondly, if it was to be seen as a right
in the land, how could the res be deﬁned where its essence was con-
stituted by the tripartite personal relations between sovereign, grantee,
and the actual cultivator of the land? The fact that the essence of thing
was so thoroughly ‘personiﬁed’ raised ‘the tension between the basic
idioms of ownership by an individual of a thing and the ofﬁce-like
hierarchy of the three personae (ruler, grantee and cultivator) who all
hold rights in the same land’ (Martha Mundy, Chapter 5). The point
is that the speciﬁcation of the rights and responsibilities attached to
land implies the (re)construction of doctrinal models of persons and
things. These models are not just found in society; they have to be con-
structed conceptually or semantically by law, from its own resources of
meaning. In one phase, this implies reaching beyond the institution to
formulate representations of evolving social realities. So, for example,
the legal treatise that is central to Mundy’s account looks beyond the
bare legal conventions to the real, social, character of the role of the
right-holder (the military grantee), and the nature of agricultural pro-
duction (the social status of agricultural labour) to argue for the propo-
sition that an abstract usufructuary right should be recognised by this
branch of Islamic jurisprudence (Mundy, Chapter 5). But in another
phase, these infused meanings have to be expressed in ‘traditional’
idioms and conventions. The ability to formulate new models presup-
poses an ability to ﬁnd semantic prototypes within the doctrinal tra-
dition. In this case, the prototype for an abstract usufructuary right is
found in existing conceptions of slave labour: ‘the potentiality arising
from the labour of a slave allows the development of more complex
formulations of rights over real property’ (Mundy, Chapter 5). At this
juncture, the semantic potential of doctrinal categories merges with the
potentiality of ‘body’, and the reference to slave labour can be seen as
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drawing on what the remaining contributions describe as the peculiarly
equivocal character of the human body.
Actualising bodily potential
Conventional techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation are opened
up to ethnographic comparison by exploring the potentialities con-
tained in ‘body’. Marilyn Strathern takes the question of bodily form
as the basis for an analogy between Western and Melanesian conven-
tions of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation. What is in question is the pro-
duction of bodily ‘wholeness’, that is, the way in which the body is –
or is not – reiﬁed as a determinate thing. ‘Wholeness’ in this sense is
one particular aspect or effect of those conventions which shape the
‘manner in which people make claims on others’, though at least in
the case of Melanesia these connections might be ‘of a politico-ritual
rather than legal nature’ (Marilyn Strathern, Chapter 7). The ques-
tion is how the potentialities associated with body are actualised in
such a way as to give effective form and force to ownership claims. In
the case of Western law, this might imply an oscillation between per-
son and thing. For example, Strathern has described elsewhere how a
frozen embryo changes its potentiality depending on whether or not it
has been defrosted, referring to the ‘ontological choreography by which
embryos can go from being “a potential person” when they are part of
the treatment process to “not being a potential person” as when it has
been decided that they can be frozen or discarded, or even back again
as when they are defrosted’.55 Thus, depending on the nature of the
relation actualised by the claim, body itself can be actualised as differ-
ent kinds of ‘form’. And this is not just a matter of recording biological
facts: ‘one effect of unanswered questions about whether or not body
parts constitute property is the realisation that detachment must be
fabricated conceptually as well as physically’ (Strathern, Chapter 7).
Bodily potential poses particular problems for Western legal conven-
tions. As Strathern observes, ‘the body seems to be taken as entire in
the double sense of being a complete functioning (or once functioning)
organism, and of being of a piece with the individual person as sub-
ject and agent’.56 This sense of biology as being ‘of a piece’ with psy-
chic or social individuality is an unexamined presupposition of modern
legal doctrine. Yan Thomas’ anthropology of Roman legal institutions
55 Strathern, Property, Substance, and Effect, at p. 175, citing Cussins.
56 Marilyn Strathern, Chapter 7.
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suggests that law once recognised that personality was multiple and
contingent. First, there was no such thing as a unitary legal persona;
instead Roman law dealt in a large number of differentiated transac-
tional personae. Secondly, the legal quality of personality was not taken
to be descriptive of biological or social individuality. So a human being
might be classed as a thing (res) for some purposes; for example (leaving
aside the obvious but problematic example of slaves) grandparents
counted as part of the inheritance (familia) to which the incoming heir
succeeded. Only much later in the tradition of Roman law were the
various transactional personae constituted by legal technique amalga-
mated into the form of a single legal persona, and only with the infusion
of Christian doctrine (speciﬁcally, the doctrinal conjoining of mortal,
perishable, body and immortal soul) did this artiﬁcial personmerge with
its biological substratum to compose a ‘whole’ form. Initially, one might
say that this gave a particular importance to the body, which encom-
passed both person and thing. In that sense, the body ‘uniﬁed’ the dis-
tinction between person and thing in the sense that it was the third
term which, logically, guaranteed the distinction. At the same time,
the body was the medium or currency in which the distinction between
person and thing was negotiated; depending on the condition of the
body, a human being might be said to be either a person or a thing.
Hence the prominence of the question of slavery in legal doctrine and
philosophy. If some compulsion could be exercised over the body so as
to reduce it to subjection or turn it into a commodity, the human being
became a thing. This was a one-way route: persons lapsed into things,
not the other way around. In other words, ‘person’ was the weighted side
of the distinction, and the body was just the medium through which
the person was exposed to the danger of becoming a mere thing. So,
for example, in French law the body is treated as a very special sort of
entity not because the law respects the body as such, but rather because
the body is a form which engages respect for the person. In this tra-
ditional arrangement, the body was neither person nor thing – it was
just the gage through which the person staked its personhood. This was
sustainable precisely because the body was always whole, so that the dis-
tinction between person and thing always passed between two whole
forms (bodies) rather than through the ‘whole’ form of the body. For
present purposes, what is signiﬁcant about this fabrication of wholeness
is that the body was the form in which the potentiality or equivocation
of the distinction between person and thing was actualised or made
determinate.
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The problem for contemporary Western legal conventions is that the
distinction now passeswithin each individual body (at least potentially).
Body parts, genes, and gametes are now ‘detachable’, and might cir-
culate independently of any whole body. In these circumstances, body
continues to function as a uniﬁcation of the distinction between person
and thing, and as the form in which the potentialities of that distinc-
tion are actualised. But the geometric point of unity or actualisation
has changed. ‘Wholeness’ has to be fabricated by making body abstract,
by exploiting its equivocal status as both person and thing to ﬁction-
alise its continuing integrity. This is what Strathern calls ‘fabrication by
default’. In her discussion of the Nufﬁeld Council on Bioethics Report
of 1995 on the status of body tissues (a text which she takes as ‘a trea-
tise on the making of things’) Chapter 7) Strathern illustrates what this
mode of fabrication involves:
In a wonderfully illogical but perfectly sensible way, at the very juncture
when through detachment it could be regarded as having ceased to be a
part of the body, the tissue or organ is reconstituted neither as a whole
entity in itself nor as an intrinsic part of a previous whole. Colloquially,
it is, somehow, a free-standing ‘part’. So what is kept alive in this nomen-
clature is the process of detachment itself: it would seem that for so long
as its detachability from the person remains evident it can be thought of
as a ‘thing’ – but not to the lengths of a ‘whole thing’.
Each detached part – precisely because it is still characterised as a
part – remains characterised by the whole of which it was once an
integral part. By keeping the process of detachment alive, bio-ethics
holds in suspense the question of how to differentiate person and thing
with respect to the body. More importantly, this fabrication of ‘whole-
ness’ allows the body to continue being the gage upon which person-
hood is staked, and as a result the distinction between person and thing
remains cast as an asymmetrical division. The sense in which fabrica-
tion by default keeps the old conﬁguration of person/thing/body alive is
perhaps clearer in another legal strategy, based on an extrapolation of
an intellectual property right (or, in this case, a droit d’auteur). The sug-
gestion is that body ‘parts’ should remain attached to their qualifying
‘wholes’ by means of a droit de destination, which is the right attributed to
authors in French intellectual property law to determine the conditions
under which a work can be published or exploited.57 Body tissues would
57 See Jean-Christophe Galloux, ‘L’utilisation des mate´riels biologiques humains: vers
un droit de destination?’ (1999) Receuil Dalloz (Chronique) 13.
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remain attached to the original whole by the continuing attachment
implied in the consent which authorises and delimits each particular
use. To make a body part a separate, distinct, entity would mean having
to make a decision as to precisely where the line between person and
thing should be drawn, which would, in turn, unravel the productive
equivocation comprised in body.
Fabrication by default is motivated by anxieties about the owner-
ship of persons: slavery. But in reality the old problem of slavery, and
the conjunctions of person and thing which were implied in political-
philosophical discussions of slavery, have been superseded. The ethno-
graphic analogy which Strathern constructs on the basis of examples
from Melanesia shows a context in which persons are ‘owned’. The
analogy is necessarily a construct; it appears as a result of render-
ing anthropological material as ‘like – rather than unlike – Euro-
American assumptions’. The Melanesian examples shows how persons
can appear as distinct, whole, things and therefore as objects of owner-
ship. ‘Wholeness’ in this context is a bodily quality. If the Melanesian
person is composed of multiple relations, then the moment in which
they become a thing and hence an object of ownership is the moment
in which their relational potentiality is entirely eclipsed by the iden-
tity and relation which is being actualised in the present moment. This
proposition condenses Strathern’s rendering of the virtual multiplicity
of the Melanesian person. Although the theory is too complex to be
addressed here,58 it is important to say something about how the theme
of ownership sets up an analogy between Melanesian fabrications of
bodily form and Western anxieties about the reiﬁcation of the body.
In theMelanesian context, bodily form can be described (by analogy)
as the subject matter of ownership because each reiﬁcation is elicited
by the person(s) to whom it is addressed (Strathern, Chapter 7):
When a male initiate steps forward all decked out in his transformed
body, a new member of the clan, his clansmen own so to speak the con-
cept of this person as ‘a male clansman’. He has to look, act and behave
like one. His clan mates acknowledge him by claiming him; they see in
him, at that moment, the embodiment of a concept.
The concept in question is a conventional form or role – that of the
‘male clansman’ – which has to be actualised in a bodily performance.
58 The deﬁnitive account of the ‘fractal’ nature of Melanesian persons is given in Mari-
lyn Strathern, The Gender of the Gift (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988).
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Effects have to be contrived; or, to use Strathern’s terminology, con-
ventions are constituted through invention. A convention is ‘a recipe
for social action’,59 but a ‘recipe’ in this sense is a virtual scheme whose
effective form is constituted by the actions that it elicits. The Melane-
sian convention of compensation60 supplies an excellent illustration
because ‘the compensation process itself deﬁnes what is transactable’.61
The point is that the substantial elements to which a compensation
claim refers are actualised – that is to say given effective form and force –
in the making of the claim. In the course of making their claim, social
groups (and persons) actualise themselves, resolving themselves into
the form appropriate to the claim they seek to sustain: ‘collectivities
differentiate, identify, and, in short, describe themselves by their role
in compensation’.62 Each actualisation of a convention is a singular
event because it consists entirely in the aesthetic and corporeal effect
achieved by actors in the very moment of exchange. Unlike the fabri-
cation of wholeness exempliﬁed in the Nufﬁeld Council’s report, this
mode of detachment is decisive: ‘the person appears whole and entire
from the perspective of a speciﬁc other’. Wholeness is effected in bod-
ily form, so that reiﬁcation or actualisation is, so to speak, an effect of
corpo-reality.
On the other side of the analogy, the Western understanding of
ownership (and hence slavery) is predicated on an antithetical rela-
tion between persons and things, an antithesis which strategies of fab-
rication by default try to salvage. The model of an antithetical or
59 Ibid. at p. 271.
60 ‘Compensation’ as it is generally understood in Papua New Guinea does everything
which an English-speaker might imagine, and much more. It refers both to the pay-
ment owed to persons and to the procedures by which they come to negotiate settle-
ment. It can thus cover recompense due to kin for nurture they have bestowed, as in
bridewealth, as well as damages, as in reparations to equalise thefts or injuries. It can
substitute for a life, in homicide compensation, or for loss of resources. Car fatalities,
war reparations, mining royalties: all potentially fall under its rubric, although since
it is generally agreed that people frequently make exorbitant demands, compensa-
tion is seen as the enemy as well as the friend of peace-making ceremonies and of
commercial exploitation alike. Its outcome is, from a Euro-American point of view,
hybrid, insofar as it consists in an equally easy translation of persons into things and
things into persons. And its procedural capability is of utmost simplicity. Liabilities
and claims are deﬁned by the positions parties take in relation to one another over
the issues of compensation itself (Marilyn Strathern, Property, Substance and Effect
(Athlone, London, 1999), p. 188).
61 Ibid. at p. 190. 62 Ibid. at p. 191.
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asymmetrical relation between persons and things imposes a particular
understanding of originating action (production). At the level of con-
tent, the Western idiom of ownership construes (proprietary) agency
in terms of what persons do to or with things by means of their labour
or knowledge. The body presents a special problem for these conven-
tions precisely because it represents the point at which the terms of
this division become indistinguishable. But until the question of body
presented this new issue of potentiality, Euro-American conceptions
of property imposed an understanding of cause/effect, or potentiality/
actuality, in which social action could be referred to the capacities of
things or the subjective competences of persons. This is one implica-
tion of what Bruno Latour calls the ‘old settlement’; the division of
the world into two ontological registers. The effect of superimposing
Western modes of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation on the Melanesian
examples is to reveal a mode of originating action based on symmet-
rical relations between persons. The basic units of social action are just
persons: persons can be reiﬁed (in whole body form) and things can
be personiﬁed, in which case they embody one of the virtual relations
which compose the Melanesian person. In this sense the social world is
not divided into two registers, but is composed of relations and attach-
ments (distinctions, one might say) which are elicited from the sym-
metrical plane of ‘personality’. Social action is not predicated upon the
potentialities lodged in some original division. Instead, it consists in
modes of actualisation which constitute their correlative potentialities.
At this point, Strathern’s ethnographic analogy suggests a resonance –
if not a proximity – between Melanesian and Euro-American contexts.
The strategy of fabrication by default is one way of coping with a world
which, through the agency of biomedicine, is increasingly recognised as
a single plane of potentiality. Where body can be either person or thing
the old asymmetry becomes dis-embedded, motivated only by emergent
regulatory objectives (witness the shift to risk analysis and procedural-
isation in bio-ethics).
Susanne Ku¨chler’s essay sketches another approach to the actuali-
sation of attachments. Her approach can be seen as an inﬂection of a
theory of art which ‘merges seamlessly with the social anthropology of
persons and their bodies, allowing for the possibility that anything could
conceivably be an art object, including living persons’.63 ‘Re-thinking
63 Susanne Ku¨chler, Chapter 8.
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attachment’ is the rubric under which the question of personiﬁcation
and reiﬁcation is addressed. ‘Attachment’ evokes the array of relations
(between persons/things) indexed by art objects, and the agency of
these objects in eliciting and exchanging potentialities between per-
sons/things. The theme of potentiality is central to the inquiry because
the question of attachment – posed in this way – opens up ethno-
graphic analogies between the understandings of origination, genera-
tion, reproduction, and replication which sustain Western idioms of
intellectual property and (in this case) Melanesian modes of connec-
tivity. In that sense, the essay can be read as a contribution to contem-
porary anthropological engagements with Western discourses or tech-
nologies of intellectual property rights (copyright and patent).64 More
speciﬁcally, it develops some of the themes introduced in Ku¨chler’s
earlier work on Malanggan carvings.65 The Malanggan in question are
produced as embodiments of (or for) the life force of an ancestor. Every-
thing turns on what ‘embodiment’ might mean in this instance. The
peculiarity of Malanggan carvings is that their role as vessels or embod-
iments is short-lived; they are destroyed or discarded immediately after
their use in memorial ceremonies, at which point the life force con-
densed in them is released. What kind of agency is implied in this artic-
ulation (embodiment and release)? In the process of being produced as
an embodiment, the Malanggan takes on the form(s) of the Melanesian
person. The carving is an assemblage of design motifs, some transmit-
ted from the past, others drawn from neighbours, and yet others which
are addressed to future ‘owners’ (and which in so doing anticipate their
future apprehension as communications from the past). This nexus of
recollection and anticipation instantiates the potentiality of body: ‘a
Malanggan converts existing relationships into virtual ones, matter into
energy, and living into ancestral agency – heralding the reversal of these
transformations at a future stage in the reproductive cycle’.66 What is
64 See the now classic article by Simon Harrison, ‘Intellectual Property and Ritual
Culture’ (1991) 21 Man (n.s.) 435.
65 See especially Susanne Ku¨chler, ‘Malangan: Art and Memory in a Melanesian
Society’ (1987) 22 Man 238; ‘Making Skins: Malangan and the Idiom of Kinship
in New Ireland’ in J. Coote and A. Shelton (eds.), Anthropology, Art, and Aesthetics
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992); ‘The Place of Memory’ in A. Forty and S. Kuchler
(eds.), The Art of Forgetting (Berg, Oxford, 1999).
66 Marilyn Strathern, ‘The Patent and the Malanggan’ (2001) 18(4) Theory, Culture
and Society 1, at p. 7.
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essential here (at least as regards the issue of intellectual property) is the
mode of potentiality or ‘potentialisation’ which this implies. In giving
a formulation to past attachments, the Malanggan is an articulation
which carries those attachments forward, into a future which it has in
some sense conﬁgured through its own agency, so that it functions as an
agent of restless transformation or emergence. This is, one might say, a
‘re-potentialisation’ of the past in anticipation of its effects in a future
present. If one needed an example of the inapplicability of divisions
between tradition and modernity, it would be difﬁcult to ﬁnd a better
one than this.
The analogy withWestern idioms of intellectual property takes shape
at this point. In patent law, the reiﬁcation (embodiment) of an indus-
trial concept turns it into an object or res which can then be licensed
for use, or used ‘negatively’ by competitors trying to ‘invent around’
the patent. In that sense the intangible res – the patent – is also a
transformative articulation between two skeins of attachment(s). The
conﬁguration or (re)collection of one set of attachments (the network
gathered into the patent, one might say) occasions the opening of
another network, which transforms the ‘old’ network by holding it up
to the ‘new’ context into which it has opened.67 As with the agency
of the Malanggan, the point is that the potential that is (provision-
ally) actualised in the patent is always being re-made, or re-actualised.
Contrary to the image of origination which sustains the idioms of intel-
lectual property law, and property law in general, the work of actualisa-
tion constitutes the potential that it actualises.68 That, at least, is one
sense of the ‘virtuality’ of the Malanggan as an embodiment. But at the
same time, proximity opens up analogical distance. The agency of the
Malanggan becomes one side of an analogy which ‘relativises’ West-
ern idioms. The Malanggan is what Ku¨chler describes as ‘an inherently
recallable image’; the destruction of the carving after its ceremonial
means that it continues to exist only as the ‘concept’ of the design. In
this sense again one might say that Malanggan designs circulate within
a regime of intellectual property. The person to whom the design is
‘entrusted’ has the right to reproduce it. However, this opens up an
analogical distance because the ‘concept’ is not understood as an intel-
lectual creation of an originating author (even if the author is not the
67 Again, the essential reference is to the work of Marilyn Strathern, notably ‘Cutting
the Network’ (1996) 2 Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society 517.
68 For philosophical accounts of this, see Gilles Deleuze, Le pli (Minuit, Paris, 1988);
Giorgio Agamben, Potentialities (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1999).
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current holder of the right). The design is simply ‘held in the head’69 of
the person authorised to reproduce it. Again, this is a mode of embodi-
ment that is sustained without reference to a division between personal,
subjective, agency, and material capacity.
In her contribution to this collection, Ku¨chler elaborates this notion
of a transformative articulation by elaborating the theme of ‘surface’ as
an aspect of the ‘allure’ of art objects. Surface was already an impor-
tant part of Ku¨chler’s interpretation of Malanggan as exemplars of a
planar (as opposed to linear) conception of surface.70 Here, the sur-
faces in question are textiles: techno-textiles, Yupno knotted cords, and
tivaevae quilts from the Cook Islands. In these examples, the theme
of ‘surface’ locates a point in which potentiality and actuality become
co-extensive, existing in the same plane or dimension, and articulat-
ing emergent relations which cannot be ﬁxed as ownership or posses-
sion. The performance of techno-textiles draws the poles of the West-
ern division into a dynamic ‘middle’: at each point, ﬁxed antitheses
become emergent forms. For example, these are textiles which ‘behave
like organisms, displaying a second nature comprised of rule-ordered
human constructions while mirroring the given, pristine nature of phys-
ical and biotic processes, laws and forms’ (Susanne Ku¨chler, Chapter 8);
in that sense, they play on the division between real and artiﬁcial by
dissolving it into a process in which the registers become indistinguish-
able. As Ku¨chler observes, these textiles are like the ‘synthetic vital-
ity’ of artiﬁcial life programmes. As I suggest in my contribution, this
mode of symmetry is expressed in Gilles Deleuze’s concept of a sim-
ulacrum: ‘a simulacrum is not an imperfect copy [une copie de´grade´e],
it contains a positive power that negates both original and copy, both
model and reproduction’.71 A similar argument is expressed in Ku¨chler’s
observation that techno-textiles turn tailoring into ‘a problem of ﬁbre,
not ﬁgure’ (Susanne Ku¨chler, Chapter 8). Fibre lies ‘between’ the two
registers which traditionally deﬁne the place of ‘tailoring’: ﬁgure and
function, substance and ornamentation, body and apparel. Intelligent
ﬁbres, which can respond to environmental (that is, physical and social)
conditions by (for example) changing their heat-retaining capacities or
their sensitivity to light, or by changing patterns or colours, effectively
69 The phrase is from Marilyn Strathern, ‘Divided Origins’ (ms.).
70 Susanne Ku¨chler, ‘Binding in the Paciﬁc: The Case of the Malanggan’ (1999) 69(3)
Oceania 145.
71 Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens (Minuit, Paris, 1969), p. 302.
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modulate the distinction between ﬁgure and clothing, actualising their
respective potentialities.72
This kind of ongoing modulation of relations and attachments is also
evidenced by the Melanesian examples. Yupno knottings hold poten-
tiality in their texture; they are strings of knots representing ancestral
place names, each knot being a determinate representation and yet it
being unclear which place name it represents, so that the topology rep-
resented by the names has to be actualised by each ‘reader’. And yet a
‘reading’ can make or break a life. The tivaevae quilts are layered with
ﬂower motifs, all ‘held together by the stitched lines of thread visible
as a continuous line on the underside of a quilt’ (Susanne Ku¨chler,
Chapter 8). Like the Malanggan, they also articulate co-existing prop-
erty rights, because the design of each layer ‘belongs’ to a different
woman, household, or clan. In the case of tivaevae, which transpose the
old layerings of barkcloth with layerings of cotton, it is no exaggeration
to say that the availability of a new cloth with new tensile qualities
‘facilitated a development of surface and thus of new forms of prop-
erty’ (emphasis added) by enabling many layers or attachments to be
(re)collected together. But in some respects, the surface of the tivaevae
quilts is different from the surface of the Malanggan. But the fact that
ordered relations are (re)collected in a single surface transforms their
potentialities. Far from being the ﬁxed co-ordinates of a terrain, they
become like the knots in Yupno cord; that is, they acquire the relational
value that is attributed by each reading of the surface, or each time a
fresh attachment is made ‘through’ the surface of the quilt. So although
in one sense the tivaevae quilt tells an ordered story of proprietary or pos-
sessory attachments, in another sense it is a resource or medium through
which these conventionalised attachments are dissolved into a ﬂux that
is ﬁxed only by the making of new attachments. The complex agency
of body, as transposed to the agency of the Malanggan, is located in the
medium of ‘surface’.
In my contribution, the exploration of bodily potential and images
of ‘organic’ action shifts from surface planes to interiorised processes.
Various legislative and bio-ethical interventions have sought to insti-
tute gene sequences as ‘the heritage of humanity’. This notion of
genetic patrimony attempts to domesticate the potentialities elicited
by biotechnology by characterising genes in terms of the old division
72 For a critique of the attribution of intelligence tomaterials, see Bernadette Bensaude-
Vincent, Eloge du mixte (Harmattan, Paris, 1998).
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between persons and things. Ironically, the old (Western) legal insti-
tutions of inheritance freely deployed some quite sophisticated tech-
niques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation which enabled the division
between persons and things to be afﬁrmed as a primordial condi-
tion while at the same time, in practice, that division was superseded
by ciphers (intention, money, writing, blood, and land) which were
equivocal or ‘hybrid’ in the sense that ciphers from either register could
be actualised either as persons or as things. But the argument for genetic
patrimony passes over this ‘alternative’ history of inheritance. Indeed, I
suggest that genes are apprehended as the ultimate objects of inher-
itance. Whereas the old institutions of inheritance were thoroughly
improbable constructions, whose apparent stability was secured by their
capacity to metabolise the contingencies of kinship and society, our
genetic inheritance is based on a natural force rather than an insti-
tutional effect (Ku¨chler, Chapter 8). This representation depends on
what could be called the ‘juridiﬁcation’ of gene action; that is, the rep-
resentation of genes as normative forces. The all too familiar character-
isation of the human genome as the ‘alphabet of human life’ collapses
bodies into genes by the familiar route of a linear process of transla-
tion and transcription: the person comes to incarnate a supra-individual
value. This gives rise to a complex choreography of personiﬁcation and
reiﬁcation, and my contribution focuses on the model of institutional
timewhich organises that choreography. The temporal scheme of inher-
itance pre-exists (and perhaps informs) the science of genetics, so that
a juridical model of time is located both in norm and nature, law and
biology. Cast in the conceptual language used at the beginning of this
introduction, one might say that the temporal order of the institution is
structured by divisions rather than distinctions. But, although the insti-
tution presupposes an external, ‘objective’, temporal horizon, in effect
the institution produces the horizon upon which it founds its operations.
The prototype for this operation is found in the primordial legal myth
of institutional origin – authochthony – in which the essential origin
of the institution is constituted by its current operations. And, far from
reinforcing the old fantasy of inheritance, law’s encounter with genes,
and hence with molecular biology, confronts it with a model of self-
production which has always been the motor force of legal institutions.
Law might be described as the original biotechnology, but only because
it produced human life by techniques of personiﬁcation and reiﬁcation
which were just as radically creative as the techniques of commercial
biotechnology.
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